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Towards a More Meaningful Comparison of Meditation 
and Hypnosis
In 2005, Pierre Rainville and I proposed 
that hypnosis be included in an early 
mechanistic model of meditation (Grant & 
Rainville, 2005) put forth by Newberg and 
Iversen (2003). The proposal was prompted 
by the substantial overlap we saw, experien-
tially and in terms of associated brain net-
works, between the two phenomena. In the 
years that have followed a flurry of studies of 
meditation, from various research domains, 
have emerged. The articles in this special is-
sue survey the current state of that proposal, 
offering clear points of convergence and di-
vergence. Rather than providing an overview 
which would necessarily be more superficial 
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than the primary articles I will attempt to 
highlight several issues I think are important 
when contrasting meditation and hypnosis, 
in terms of the underlying mental / neural 
processes involved.
Beginning with a somewhat provoca-
tive question, I would like to ask whether a 
contrast between meditation and hypnosis 
is even meaningful. This may sound absurd 
at first but several conceptual and meth-
odological issues arise which may call into 
question the validity of certain comparisons. 
While I believe the answer to the question is 
yes, that is, these phenomena can and should 
be compared, it is certainly not a simple and 
straightforward endeavor. In Fig. 1 an argu-
ment tree is presented which ends with the 
conclusion that there are many paths which 
could lead to invalid comparisons or errone-
ous interpretations. This is not meant to be 
an exhaustive list and is approached solely 
from a meditative perspective. I will work 
backwards through the tree to expand on 
these risks.
For any comparison of meditation and 
hypnosis, I think there is a substantial risk 
that the description of meditation, presented 
by the researchers, will not actually corre-
spond to what is measured. This could oc-
cur for several reasons. First, ambiguity con-
cerning the meditative practice / state being 
investigated could easily arise by conflating 
aspects of different meditation techniques 
into a single construct or qualitative de-
scription which, in actuality, does not exist. 
Meditation cannot be considered a solitary 
construct and while attempts have been 
made to meaningfully categorize the myriad 
Figure 1. An argument tree summarizing several factors which could lead to an erroneous con-
clusion of similarity or dissimilarity when comparing meditation and hypnosis. Branches of the 
tree (variably shaded) represent different potential risks. 
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meditation techniques (most notably by Lutz 
et al. (2008)) many practices do not fit well 
within accepted taxonomies. Some practices 
may span several categories and others may 
not match any category. Different practices 
are intended to do different things and it 
follows that they will be associated with 
varying effects and experiential qualities. It 
would be wrong to assume for example, that 
all meditation practices lead to high levels of 
absorption. The likelihood of conflating one 
meditative technique with another is height-
ened by the fact that many people engage in 
multiple practices which likely influence one 
another and the abilities / qualities that arise 
from each practice.
A second route which may lead to an er-
roneous description of what was measured 
would arise if traits associated with expert 
meditators were mistakenly conferred to 
more novice practitioners. Traditional ac-
counts of meditation, which are often cited 
as evidence for the association with certain 
mental states, are likely based on the experi-
ences of monks who could be considered ‘ca-
reer meditators’. Even if one correctly chose 
and measured a meditation practice which 
targeted mental absorption, to continue with 
that example, an individual may need to 
practice for years to see measurable increas-
es. Thus, the state achieved by more novice 
practitioners may not involve the high levels 
of absorption the experimenters assume to 
be present. 
The third path which may lead to an in-
correct description of what is actually being 
compared to hypnosis relates to less obvious 
and possibly implicit aspects of meditation. 
One could argue that the two phenomena 
differ in terms of explicit suggestions, the 
motivation for the involvement and the rela-
tion to a guiding figure. I believe these differ-
ences are minimal.
While hypnosis involves explicit sugges-
tions for some kind of effect which the re-
cipient is motivated towards, meditation is 
often thought of as a ‘clearing of the mind’ 
and / or ‘letting go’.  There may be seeds of 
truth to these descriptions of meditation but 
they certainly do not apply across the board 
and individuals do not simply begin medi-
tation spontaneously. Likely, motivating 
factors such as dissatisfaction, stress / anxiety 
or pain often lead an individual to seek out 
a coping strategy or means to remedy their 
ills. In seeking out such a remedy they will 
undoubtedly read books and articles, visit 
meditation centers and clinics and receive 
all kinds of ‘suggestions’ concerning the 
benefits and effects of meditative practice. 
While these may not be explicit suggestions 
made during the meditation session itself, as 
in hypnosis, they are undoubtedly embedded 
in the person’s desire to learn. Furthermore, 
meditators will often receive teachings 
(dharma talks) in between practice sessions. 
It may not be surprising that these talks are 
often delivered in a calm soothing voice by 
the guiding figure. Finally, somewhat closer 
to hypnosis, many meditations are guided. 
Certain exercises in the Mindfulness Based 
Stress Reduction (MBSR) fall under this cat-
egory, which is arguably the most influential 
program in terms of the current scientific 
notion of meditation.
This brings up the final point in this 
category, the idea that the relationship be-
tween the client and hypnotist is a crucial 
difference when contrasting meditation and 
hypnosis. I would argue that a good medita-
tion teacher is just as important to success-
ful meditation as a hypnotist is to successful 
hypnosis, perhaps more so. In hypnosis trust 
or resonance is likely an important factor in 
the success of the state induction and out-
comes. Owing to the fact that meditation is 
learned over a long period of time one must 
also trust that one’s teacher is adept, as this 
is a considerable investment. Further, medi-
tation is not always as rosy and grey as it is 
often portrayed in the West. As one delves 
into the inner workings of the mind in an 
attempt to clear oneself of negative condi-
tioned responses all sorts of personal crises 
may arise. It is in these times that a media-
tion teacher becomes of utmost importance, 
to guide and reassure the practitioner.
To summarize the first main branch of 
my argument tree, one must be careful to ac-
curately describe the meditation state / prac-
tice they are attempting to contrast with 
hypnosis. Differences in technique, the 
number of practices an individual engages 
in, experience level within a technique and 
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less obvious aspects of meditation may all 
falsely lead to the conclusion that meditation 
and hypnosis are different, or conversely, 
similar.
The second major branch of the argu-
ment tree revolves around how one would 
go about contrasting meditation and hyp-
nosis in a meaningful way. When conduct-
ing an experiment of emotional processing 
in healthy individuals one is sure to control 
for, and exclude, depressed participants as it 
is well established that this is a special popu-
lation which is likely to show effects that are 
not applicable to everyone. For similar rea-
sons it may not be appropriate, when con-
trasting states of hypnosis and meditation, 
to compare a group of people highly trained 
in meditation with a group of meditation 
naïve individuals undergoing hypnosis (i.e. 
between subject designs). There is abun-
dant evidence now showing that meditation 
training alters many aspects of biological 
functioning including task-related and task-
unrelated functional brain activation (Grant, 
Courtemanche, & Rainville, 2011; Taylor 
et al., 2012), brain structure including grey 
and white matter (Grant, Courtemanche, 
Duerden, Duncan, & Rainville, 2010; Luders, 
Clark, Narr, & Toga, 2011), behaviour and 
cardiovascular (Grant & Rainville, 2009), 
hormonal and immune (Pace et al., 2010) 
systems. Such evidence suggests that trained 
meditators are a special population and as 
such cannot reasonably be assumed to be 
comparable to a non-meditating sample. 
From a brain imaging perspective we may 
be able to conclude that states of meditation 
and hypnosis are different if the networks re-
cruited during meditation differ from those 
recruited during hypnosis, all other things 
being equal. However, the evidence cited 
above suggests all other things are not equal. 
This raises many interesting questions. For 
example, is it reasonable to assume that 
meditators would have a similar activation 
pattern during hypnosis if they have pre-ex-
isting differences in the associated networks? 
Might meditation training change how one 
experiences hypnosis or the ability / suscepti-
bility of the individual to induction and / or 
the suggestions? Perhaps a meditative state 
in absolute beginners is more similar to a 
hypnotic state than a meditative state in ad-
vanced practitioners. An example from my 
own work with trained Zen meditators, in 
comparison to the work of a colleague with 
newly trained meditators (recently reviewed 
in (Zeidan, Grant, Brown, McHaffie, & 
Coghill, 2012)) suggests that meditation ex-
perience may make a big difference. 
In a series of studies conducted in the lab 
of Pierre Rainville we were able to show that 
Zen meditators are less sensitive to pain and 
can modulate pain during mindful atten-
tion (Grant & Rainville, 2009). Further, they 
have thicker grey matter in pain-related re-
gions (dorsal anterior cingulate for example) 
(Grant et al., 2010) and stronger functional 
activation of an overlapping set of regions 
during pain, in comparison to a control 
group (Grant et al., 2011). We did not ob-
serve any reductions in brain activation dur-
ing the pain, in pain-related cortices, as has 
been observed during hypnosis (Rainville, 
Carrier, Hofbauer, Bushnell, & Duncan, 
1999). On the other hand, Zeidan et al. (2011) 
observed even stronger pain reductions af-
ter training participants for a mere 4 days, 
which was associated with reduced activa-
tion of the primary sensory cortex, similar 
to hypnosis (Rainville et al., 1999). Thus, in 
some respects the meditative state in begin-
ners, and the influence it had on pain and 
pain networks, resembled hypnosis more so 
than in long term practitioners. Of course 
this kind of comparison is exactly what I am 
trying to suggest is extremely limited.
Along with trying to illuminate pos-
sible pitfalls when contrasting meditation 
and hypnosis my aim was to suggest that 
a comparison of the extant literature will 
not provide much of an answer. Ultimately, 
the most fruitful way to compare medita-
tion and hypnosis would be to do so within 
subjects and, if possible, with a longitudinal 
design. One could measure the influence of 
hypnosis and meditation (on pain perhaps) 
in meditation naïve individuals (a mean-
ingful comparison in itself). This would be 
followed by a contrast of these same con-
ditions, in the same individuals, after they 
have learned to meditate. Only then will 
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we be able to address questions of whether 
these two phenomena rely on the same brain 
networks and mechanisms. Smaller steps 
might cross sectionally contrast meditation 
naïve individuals in meditative and hypnotic 
states with trained meditators in the same 
conditions. Until such results are available 
I think there is insufficient evidence to con-
clude that meditation and hypnosis rely on 
the same or different neural mechanisms 
and we must be cautious when making our 
interpretations.
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